By Shannon Petersen
On December 31, 2009, the Third Circuit held that a borrower must prove detrimental reliance to obtain actual damages for a violation of the federal Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). See Vallies v. Sky Bank, ---F.3d---, 2009 WL 5154473 (3rd Cir. 2009).
By John Stigi and Martin White
In Alston v. Countrywide Financial Corp., 2009 WL 3448264 (3d Cir. October 28, 2009), the United States Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit confronted the issue of whether consumer plaintiffs alleging a violation of section 8 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (“RESPA”), codified in relevant part at 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(2), need to show a monetary injury “in the form of an overcharge” to have standing to bring a private right of action against a mortgage lender. The Third Circuit concluded that plaintiffs need not suffer an overcharge because the “plain language of RESPA section 8 indicate[s] that Congress created a private right of action without requiring an overcharge allegation.” Rather, plaintiffs must only allege that a defendant received a “kickback” or offered a “sham service” under RESPA section 8(a) and 8(b) –– regardless of whether plaintiffs have suffered a monetary harm –– to have Article III standing to sue in the Third Circuit. This decision paves the way for class action litigation against other lenders asserting claims under Section 8 of RESPA.
By Craig Cardon and Elizabeth Berman
The California Court of Appeal has recently published two new decisions involving data privacy class actions. Both involve claims under the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act. The most recent, Jessica Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 2009 DJDAR 15191, affirmed the judgment against the plaintiff on the grounds that it is not a violation of Song-Beverly to request a zip code during a credit card transaction, even if the zip code is matched with a name to acquire that individual's address, and that the same conduct is not a serious invasion of privacy where the home address information is publicly available and plaintiff has taken no special steps to protect it. Approximately one month earlier, the same panel held in Susan Powers v. Pottery Barn Inc., (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1039, that the federal CAN-SPAM Act does not preempt a Song-Beverly claim based on a request for an email address, and sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.
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