Continuing the trend of recognizing Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) as a muscular privacy-protective statute, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District has ruled that the most common statutory violations of BIPA are subject to a five-year statute of limitations. BIPA imposes several duties on companies that collect, store or use biometric data—e.g., fingerprints, facial geometry scans—from Illinois residents. Prevailing plaintiffs may recover liquidated damages ranging from $1,000 to $5,000 for each BIPA violation (plus attorneys’ fees), and these provisions incentivize plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring BIPA claims as class actions.
Continue Reading Illinois Appellate Court Affirms 5-Year Statute of Limitations Period for Certain BIPA Claims

In prior posts (here and here), we raised questions that companies may want to ask when evaluating their arbitration clauses and making changes to them.  In this third installment, we look at what companies should be doing to ensure that they can present proof of their arbitration agreements if ever required to do so in court.  Your company may have a perfect arbitration clause, but if a customer claims never to have signed the arbitration agreement or not to have seen the website providing notice of the terms and conditions, you will have to present evidence that the customer is wrong.
Continue Reading Avoiding Formation Challenges To Your Arbitration Clause With Consumers

Arbitration clauses with class action waivers remain one of the most effective tools that consumer-facing companies can employ to fend off consumer class action litigation.  Yet many companies stumble both in getting their customers to agree to the arbitration clause and in drafting a clause that captures all claims that they might face.  As we continue to work, shop, and engage with the world from home, companies should perform a quick “health-check” of their arbitration clause, asking themselves at least the following questions:
Continue Reading An Arbitration Clause Health Check

As one year ends, another begins.  So too it seems with California’s embrace of multi-million dollar privacy class actions.  The purported illegal recording of cellular or cordless phone calls under Section 632.7 of the California Penal Code has long been a favorite of the class action bar due to the availability of staggering statutory damages.  These actions are all but dead, however, following the Fourth Appellate District’s decision in Smith v. LoanMe, Inc., 2019 DJDAR 11930, holding that some form of eavesdropping is required to state a cause of action under Section 632.7.  No longer is the simple recording of a cellular or cordless telephone call between the actual participants to the call actionable.  While many have long argued that the actual language of the statute as well as its legislative history – including the legislative history of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (Pen. Code §§ 630, et seq.) in general – require some form of spying to state a claim under Section 632.7, the court of appeal in LoanMe has made it official.  Barring review or inconsistent rulings by other appellate districts, privacy class actions seeking statutory damages under Penal Code section 632.7 are the past.  
Continue Reading The Death of One California Privacy Class Action, and the Birth of Another

When it comes to compelling arbitration in California, courts often put the moving party to the test. The most recent example is the Fourth Appellate District’s decision in Fabian v. Renovate America. Affirming a lower court’s decision, the Court of Appeal held that the defendant failed to meet its burden of proof that an electronically signed contract – one containing a 15-digit alphanumeric verification from DocuSign and the words “Identify Verification Code: ID Verification Complete” – was in fact signed by the plaintiff. Stating that the “burden of authenticating an electronic signature is not great,” the Court of Appeal went on to hold that the defendant had not met its burden as it had failed to submit evidence explaining the DocuSign verification process. The court of appeal acknowledged the acceptance of a DocuSign verified signature in Newton v. Am. Debt Servs (N.D. Cal. 2012) 854 F.Supp.2d 712, but distinguished that case finding that Renovate had not submitted “evidence about the process used to verify Fabian’s electronic signature via DocuSign, including who sent Fabian the Contract, how the Contract was sent to her, how Fabian’s electronic signature was placed on the Contract, who received the signed the [sic] Contract, how the signed Contract was returned to Renovate, and how Fabian’s identification was verified as the person who actually signed the Contract.”
Continue Reading Is Hate Too Strong A Word (When It Comes To Compelling Arbitration In California)?

Over the last six months, at least four putative class actions have been filed under the Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”)—an obscure Illinois statute passed about seven years ago to regulate the collection and use of consumers’ biometric information.  In relevant part, the BIPA requires entities in possession of biometric information (i.e., retina scans, fingerprints, voiceprints, etc.) to retain a specific written policy governing data retention and to collect written consent from consumers before collecting biometric information.
Continue Reading Tag, You’re It: Biometric Information Privacy Act Class Action Against Shutterfly Moves Past 12(b)(6)

In DirecTV v. Imburgia, No. 14-462, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 7999 (December 14, 2015) the United States Supreme Court reversed a California Court of Appeal decision interpreting, and invalidating, an arbitration clause containing a class arbitration waiver, holding that the Court of Appeal’s interpretation was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”).  The Court then ordered the Court of Appeal to enforce the arbitration agreement at issue.  The Court’s opinion, which was decided 6-3 with two dissenting opinions, reinforces earlier Supreme Court precedent holding that state courts cannot avoid the preemptive effect of the FAA by applying facially neutral state contract principles in a way that disfavors arbitration. 
Continue Reading U.S. Supreme Court Holds California Court of Appeal’s Interpretation of Arbitration Clause Preempted by FAA

The long saga of In re Tobacco Cases II recently produced yet another appellate opinion addressing California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), False Advertising Law (“FAL”), and the remedies they provide.  This time, in In re Tobacco Cases II, 240 Cal. App. 4th 779 (Sept. 28, 2015) (“Tobacco II”), the appellate court considered what “restitution” under the UCL actually means, and how to appropriately calculate it.  In doing so, the court provided much needed guidance on these issues and (assuming the decision is affirmed) largely eliminated the “full refund” theory of restitutionary recovery in all but the most extreme UCL and FAL actions.
Continue Reading Plaintiffs’ Full Refund Theory of Restitution Under California’s Unfair Competition Law Goes Up in Smoke in Latest Tobacco II Opinion

In Aguirre v. Amscan Holdings, Inc., Case No. 073059, 2015 Cal. App. LEXIS 214 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015), a California Court of Appeal reversed the denial of certification of a putative class alleging violation of Civil Code Section 1747.08 of California’s Song Beverly Credit Card Act.  The trial court had denied certification because the plaintiff did not show the ability to identify, locate, and notify class members.  The court of appeal rejected that standard, and found that the class was, in fact, ascertainable because (1) the class definition contained a set of “common characteristics” that would allow class members to self-identify themselves, and (2) because the plaintiff had suggested an objective method for identifying class members.  This decision clarifies the standard for ascertainability in California state court class actions.
Continue Reading California Court of Appeal Lowers the Bar on Ascertainability Requirement in Consumer Class Actions

On December 12, 2014, Judge Sue E. Myerscough issued an epic 238-page order granting in part and denying in part cross summary judgment motions filed in United States of America, et al. v. Dish Network, L.L.C. (“Dish Network”). United States v. Dish Network, L.L.C., No. 09-3073, 2014 WL 7013223 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2014). Despite finding that Dish was liable for over 50 million phone calls, there was a silver lining for both Dish and future TCPA defendants.
Continue Reading Hold the Phone: Judge Holds Dish Network on the Line for Tens of Millions of Calls, but Leaves Silver Lining for TCPA Defendants

On December 15, 2014, the United States Supreme Court resolved a circuit split in holding that a defendant need not supply evidence of the amount in controversy in its notice of removal under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”).  In Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, No. 13-719, 574 U.S. __ (2014), the plaintiff, Owens, filed a putative class action in Kansas state court alleging defendants had underpaid royalties to putative class members under certain oil and gas leases.  The defendant, Dart, filed a notice of removal with the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas pursuant to CAFA.  To establish diversity jurisdiction under CAFA, defendants must show, among other things, that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.
Continue Reading No Proof Necessary: SCOTUS Rules Defendant’s Notice Of Removal Under CAFA Need Not Include Evidence of The Amount In Controversy